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Over the past 30 years, access to formal financial services for low-income people has 
increased dramatically. However, misguided efforts 
to reduce criminal behavior threaten to slow the 
pace of that progress.
International standards on anti-money laundering 
(AML) and combating the financing of terrorism 
(CFT) promote financial integrity and support the 
fight against crime. However, the inappropriate 
implementation of these standards—especially 
in emerging markets—plays a role in excluding 
millions of low-income people from formal financial 
services. It can relegate the unserved majority to 
the informal world of cash, undermining social and 
economic advancements and denying regulators 
and law enforcement a key means of strengthening 
financial integrity: the ability to trace the movement 
of money. 
It need not be this way. Financial inclusion and 
an effective financial integrity regime can—and 
should—be complementary national policy objectives. 
International AML/CFT standards have some flexibility, 
enabling countries to craft effective and appropriate 
controls. The challenge is finding the right level of 
protection for a particular financial environment.
Fortunately, a growing body of analysis and positive 
examples from countries around the world is beginning 
to point the way. This Focus Note shares insights 
gained from studying some early experiences. 
Building on earlier studies, including a CGAP analysis 
(Isern et al. 2005), the FIRST Initiative funded a five-
country study (Bester et al. 2008) to analyze the 
effects of AML/CFT regulation on access to finance in 
Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, and South Africa.1 
It concludes that AML/CFT measures can negatively 
affect access to, and use of, financial services if the 
measures are not carefully designed. The study 
identifies factors that may intensify this impact, provides 
approaches on the design of appropriate AML/CFT 
controls that complement financial access policies, and 
suggests key design principles for AML/CFT controls. 
Some of these suggestions are as follows:
AML/CFT measures should be tailored to •	
the domestic environment and the domestic 
risks of money laundering and financing of 
terrorism (ML/FT).
AML/CFT controls should be proportionate to •	
the prevailing or likely risks.
AML/CFT obligations should be matched to the •	
capacity of both public and private institutions.
Where institutional capacity is lacking, a plan •	
should be developed to improve capacity and 
phase in AML/CFT obligations as institutional 
capacity increases.
Law enforcement should be reserved as •	
primarily the responsibility of the state, and 
law enforcement responsibilities should not be 
unnecessarily shifted to private institutions.
International AML/CFT standards 
and financial services for low-
income people
FATF Recommendations
The 40 recommendations of the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), along with its special recommendations 
regarding CFT, are the international standard for 
AML/CFT regulations (see Box 1).2
Although the recommendations are not legally 
binding on a country, noncompliant countries risk 
being regarded as havens for criminals and their illicit 
proceeds and harming their standing as an investment 
destination. Financial institutions operating in 
countries that are in compliance are required to give 
special attention to dealings with any persons and 
institutions of a noncompliant country. In practice, 
this often slows the pace of transactions; it may even 
lead to a decision to avoid business relationships with 
those persons and institutions.
The FATF recommendations outline measures that 
countries, financial institutions, and certain other 
businesses and professions should adopt to counter 
ML/FT. Countries are advised to do the following:
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1  The study also includes case studies on the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Philippines.
2  See the FATF Web site (http://www.fatf-gafi.org) for the complete set of recommendations and related guidance.
2Adopt laws that criminalize laundering the •	
proceeds of crime and providing financial or 
material support to terrorists. 
Establish a •	 financial intelligence unit (FIU) to 
receive, analyze, and disseminate information 
regarding potential ML/FT transactions or 
activities.
Ensure appropriate and effective oversight of •	
financial institutions.
Cooperate with one another in investigating and •	
prosecuting crimes.
The measures required of financial institutions often 
have the most direct impact on financial access. 
For example, financial institutions are required to 
maintain customer due diligence (CDD)3 measures, 
such as the following: 
Identify their customers and verify their identities •	
using reliable, independent source documents, 
data, or information (in practice, by verifying 
personal details, such as their names, available 
national identity numbers, date of birth, and 
contact information).4 
Obtain information on the purpose and intended •	
nature of the business relationship.
Maintain comprehensive records of customer •	
information and transactions.
Monitor customer transactions, and file a report •	
with the FIU or other appropriate authorities if 
funds are suspected to be the proceeds of crime 
or linked to the financing of terrorism.
Institutions must also ensure that employees 
understand their legal obligations and that measures 
are in place to enable the institution, its officers, and 
its employees to meet their compliance obligations.
AML/CFT laws and regulations are normally enforced 
with serious penalties, such as large fines and 
imprisonment. A convicted institution’s reputation 
may suffer; it may lose customers and business 
relationships and may even lose its license.
Financial service providers working with 
low-income clients
FATF recommendations cover a broad range of 
services and activities, including accepting deposits 
from the public, providing consumer credit, and 
transferring money or value in the formal and informal 
sector. The scope of the recommendations includes 
financial service providers that serve low-income 
clients (e.g., the diverse grouping of microfinance 
institutions [MFIs] and new entrants such as branchless 
banking operators).5 
This Focus Note addresses some of the negative 
impacts of inappropriate AML/CFT controls on the 
services and client base of these providers. However, 
well-designed AML/CFT controls also provide them 
with protection and opportunities. The following are 
some examples of this: 
AML/CFT controls can help institutions •	
understand their customers better, thereby 
enabling them to design and market better 
products and support better customer service 
in general. 
3  Some regulatory regimes and practitioners use the term “know your customer” (KYC) interchangeably with CDD.
4  CDD measures also include the duty to take reasonable steps to identify and verify the identity of a beneficial owner. The beneficial owner is the 
natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a financial services customer (for instance, the individual who owns the majority of the shares 
in the corporation that wishes to open an account) and/or the person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted.
5  MFIs include a range of financial service providers that serve low-income clients. Examples include savings and postal banks, financial cooperatives, 
nongovernmental organizations, associations, community and rural banks, commercial banks with broad retail services, money transfer companies, 
etc. Branchless banking operators include mobile phone companies (mobile network operators), retail agents, and other companies that provide 
financial services outside of a traditional bank branch. Branchless banking could use a variety of delivery channels, including mobile phones, 
payment cards (credit, debit, prepaid), automatic teller machines, point of sale machines, and other existing infrastructure. Depending on the 
country, MFIs and branchless banking operators may be included in broader banking regulation or may be covered by separate regulation.
FATF is an intergovernmental body that sets global 
AML/CFT standards, assesses member compliance 
with those standards, promotes global compliance 
with the standards, and identifies AML/CFT threats. 
Its members include 32 jurisdictions and two regional 
organizations (the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
the European Commission). FATF works closely 
with eight FATF-style regional bodies in Africa, 
Asia/Pacific, the Caribbean, Europe, Eurasia, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and South America, 
representing the majority of countries in the world. 
Globally, about 180 jurisdictions have directly 
endorsed the FATF recommendations.
Box 1: What is FATF?
3If AML/CFT controls are confined to standard, •	
regulated financial institutions and services, 
then informal service providers could be left 
vulnerable, and they may be subjected to a 
disproportionate amount of criminal abuse. 
Providers find it easier to engage regulated •	
financial institutions that may otherwise avoid 
doing business with them for fear of ML/FT. 
AML/CFT controls can help strengthen overall •	
anti-fraud controls.
Risk-based approach to AML/CFT
FATF’s recommendations envisage AML/CFT controls 
that are sufficiently uniform across the globe to prevent 
displacing ML/FT from one jurisdiction to another. 
However, countries may follow a risk-based approach 
when they implement key recommendations. This 
enables countries to design and implement effective 
AML/CFT controls that are appropriate to their risks 
and national context.
FATF encourages countries and institutions to focus 
their attention and resources on people and activities 
that pose a high risk of ML/FT (FATF 2007).6 Countries 
may decide that reduced or simplified controls are 
sufficient to safeguard low-risk activities against abuse. 
If a country finds that some financial services for low-
income people meet FATF criteria for exemption, it 
may even exclude those activities, wholly or partially, 
from its national AML/CFT regime.
Guidance for low-capacity countries
FATF recognizes that some countries lack the 
resources to immediately implement a comprehensive 
system that effectively regulates all areas posing 
material risk.7 For these countries, FATF (2008a) 
suggests designing controls around their risks as 
well as their resources. The design process should be 
supported by political commitment to comprehensive 
AML/CFT measures and informed by a proper 
appraisal of institutional capacity and an assessment 
of the ML/FT risks. 
A country’s implementation plan for AML/CFT controls 
may allow for some measures to be phased in or 
sequenced. Sequencing allows a country to implement 
key AML/CFT measures while improving its capacity 
to implement the remaining recommendations.8
Access-friendly AML/CFT controls 
Country-specific factors could unintentionally create 
barriers to financial access. The FIRST study identified 
the following examples.
Limitations in identification 
infrastructure 
Identity verification is easier and cheaper when there is a 
trusted, standardized national identification (ID) system, 
for instance a system based on national ID cards or a 
system combining various government and commercial 
databases. Many countries do not have such a system, 
and even in nations that do issue ID documents, the 
documents may not be perceived as reliable. 
If there is no national ID system, or if the system lacks 
integrity, or if the database is not accessible, financial 
institutions often incur additional costs to verify CDD 
information. This may cause institutions to withdraw 
from low-value, lower profit transactions and markets. 
Furthermore, even countries with reliable national ID 
systems may fail to cover a significant percentage of 
low-income people or people in remote rural areas, 
leaving them without formal proof of identity and/or 
proof of formal residential addresses.9 
The dynamic can be even more pronounced with 
some new business models that could expand access 
to financial services. For example, in some branchless 
banking models, clients may register and/or conduct 
transactions at a distance rather than face to face. 
These models rely on a minimum amount of client ID 
information that must then be verified against third-
party databases, such as a national ID database or 
credit bureau databases. If such systems do not exist 
or if they lack integrity, regulators may not approve 
the business model. 
6  In 2007 FATF issued guidance on the risk-based approach for financial institutions. Similar guidance was since issued for accountants, dealers in 
precious metals and stones, real estate agents, trust and company service providers, legal professionals, casinos, and money service businesses. 
7  FATF defines “low capacity countries” as low-income countries that face challenges such as competing priorities for scarce government resources, 
a severe lack of resources and skilled workforce to implement government programs, overall weakness in legal institutions, a dominant informal 
sector, a cash-based economy, poor documentation and data retention systems, and a very small financial sector. See FATF (2008a).
8  Key measures include the criminalization of ML/FT, CDD and record keeping duties, and the reporting of suspicious transaction.
9  FATF does not require institutions to request and verify a customer’s address; however, this is common practice in developed countries and is 
required by some developing countries.
4Limited government capacity
Government capacity to supervise and enforce 
AML/CFT measures can affect its financial inclusion 
policy. This is particularly relevant in three areas.
Supervision.•	  With limited capacity, supervisors 
will tend to supervise entities that are easily 
accessible—typically the largest regulated 
entities. They may pay little attention to small, 
informal, and unregulated institutions. As a 
result, the compliance cost for supervised 
institutions will increase, with no similar increase 
for unsupervised institutions. This may cause 
well-supervised institutions to withdraw from 
low-income markets where they compete 
with unsupervised institutions. It may also 
lead businesses to seek relationships with 
well-supervised institutions rather than riskier 
unsupervised/unregulated institutions. 
Law enforcement.•	  Law enforcement deficiencies 
usually mean that risk assessments are not based 
on actual information, but instead on hypotheses 
or international typologies. Without an objective 
understanding of the risks in their country, 
regulators tend to “play it safe,” often adopting 
control measures that are more onerous than 
required.
Using AML/CFT controls to advance the •	
formalization of the economy. AML/CFT 
controls require financial institutions to disclose 
client information to authorities to combat 
ML/FT. However, if this information is used for other 
purposes, such as combating tax evasion, clients 
whose tax affairs are not in good order may decide 
to remain outside the formal financial system.
Strict application by formal financial 
institutions
Large formal financial institutions tend to apply 
AML/CFT controls more rigidly than intended by the 
regulator. For instance, although national regulations 
may allow discretionary use of alternative documents 
to verify customers, institutions tend to limit discretion 
and the types of documents accepted. When 
mistakes can lead to vast penalties and costs for the 
institution (and in some cases, for the compliance 
officer personally), frontline staff may not be trusted 
to use discretion and to decide which document is 
best to verify the details of a particular client.
Extent of informal financial services 
Especially in lesser developed economies, financial 
services are often provided informally through 
money lenders, informal money transfer operators, 
unregistered community finance organizations, and 
others. Low-income people often prefer to use 
informal financial services because of convenient 
locations, familiarity with the institutions and their 
services, and often fewer restrictions (such as ID 
requirements). Inappropriate AML/CFT measures can 
inadvertently push people away from formal financial 
services or create unnecessary barriers to those who 
want to begin using formal financial services.
Linkages to international partners and 
markets 
Countries have varying degrees of openness to 
international financial markets through cross-border 
commercial relationships, cross-border transactions, 
and foreign ownership of domestic institutions. 
Countries with more openness are likely to face 
more direct and indirect pressure to adopt AML/
CFT controls that reflect those implemented by their 
main international investors and trading partners. 
The recommendations guide financial institutions to 
ensure that AML/CFT principles are applied to their 
branches and majority-owned subsidiaries located 
abroad, especially in countries that do not apply 
or insufficiently apply FATF recommendations.10 As 
a result, foreign parent companies often require 
domestic financial subsidiaries to implement controls 
that are designed abroad. If those controls are 
stricter than required by the ML/FT risks of the 
particular country, they may undermine its financial 
inclusion policy. 
Policy approaches and recommendations 
Several countries designed their AML/CFT laws to 
minimize unnecessary adverse affects on financial 
access and to promote both financial inclusion and 
financial integrity. Drawing on initial experiences in 
these countries, the FIRST study identified several 
measures that facilitate the design of appropriate 
10  Application in remote branches and subsidiaries must be done to the extent that local laws and regulations permit. If such implementation 
is prohibited, financial institutions should advise competent authorities in the country of the parent institution that they cannot apply the FATF 
recommendations (Recommendation 22).
5national AML/CFT controls that support financial 
inclusion. These measures work best when used 
together and within a comprehensive policy 
framework. 
In the examples presented here, implementation of 
the approaches is considered to be work in progress. 
The examples are not used to illustrate proscriptive 
measures but rather to highlight some experiences 
to date. 
Develop a policy to support effective 
and proportional AML/CFT controls and 
financial inclusion. 
Many government agencies and departments 
are involved in different aspects of the AML/CFT 
framework and of financial inclusion. The core 
business of these agencies and departments often 
give them very different perspectives on AML/CFT 
approaches, policies, and priorities. To ensure a 
cohesive approach, the country should adopt a clear, 
overarching policy that commits the government 
as a whole to effective and proportional controls. 
The policy should be comprehensive and reflect the 
approaches outlined in the following. 
To get the right balance, consult with 
the private sector and other key actors. 
To ensure that the AML/CFT framework is addressing 
appropriate risks while supporting financial inclusion, 
it is critical to consult financial service providers, law 
enforcement agencies, financial regulators, the FIU, 
and other key role players. Because financial security 
and financial access are ongoing concerns, these 
discussions also should be ongoing.
It is especially important to engage those who are 
knowledgeable about social exclusion, financial 
inclusion, and informal financial services. Unregistered 
financial service providers, social welfare providers, 
ID agencies, and credit bureaus have important 
perspectives to share about ML/FT risk and 
appropriate risk control measures. 
A risk assessment may show that the risk profile of 
financial service providers working with low-income 
customers is relatively low and justifies simplified 
AML/CFT measures or even an exemption from 
measures that would otherwise create unnecessary 
barriers to access. The risk profile of such institutions 
may be lower because of the following: 
Clients are generally natural persons (not •	
complex corporate clients where ultimate 
control can be obscured). 
Providers traditionally have a more personal •	
relationship with their clients and know 
far more about their clients’ activities than 
standard financial service providers. This 
knowledge enables the provider to detect and 
prevent abuse. 
The transactions normally involve relatively •	
small amounts, making them less attractive for 
large-scale abuse.
Of course, these factors do not mean that there 
is no risk of abuse. Smaller institutions may not 
have adequate control systems, exposing them to 
potential abuse. Money launderers and terrorism 
financiers often split large transactions into 
several smaller transactions, schemes referred 
to as “splitting,” “smurfing,” or “structuring.” 
Financial service providers working with low-
income clients may be targets of very small 
structured transactions (micro- or nanostructuring). 
However, the coordination and effort involved 
make this relatively unattractive. Transaction limits 
or caps appropriate to a low-income market and/
or monitoring of transactions can reduce the risk 
even further.
Different types of financial services have different 
risk profiles. Cross-border money transfer services 
may pose a higher risk than domestic transfers. 
Likewise, payment services normally pose a higher 
ML/FT risk than microcredit services, because the 
receiving party may not be personally known to 
the service provider, and the provider often knows 
less about the sender than a lender knows about 
its customers. 
The potential for abuse also varies by institution 
and provider type. For instance, a bank that offers 
microfinance services may have a world-class 
risk management system to mitigate its risks. A 
small MFI may have a limited customer base and 
may know each of its customers by name. Both 
providers may therefore have adequate measures 
in place and, as a consequence, a lower risk of ML/
FT abuse. 
Box 2: Different risks for institutions serving low-income people
6Assess the specific ML/FT risks of  
your country.
A risk assessment helps governments design 
appropriate and proportional AML/CFT controls. 
It attempts to determine the nature and scale of 
ML/FT in the country as well as vulnerabilities 
in existing controls (FATF 2007, FATF 2008c). 
Developing countries with low capacity should find 
a risk assessment particularly useful because it will 
help them to use their limited resources to address 
key risks (FATF 2008a). 
In practice, assessments tend to focus on high-risk 
activities. However, governments need balanced 
risk assessments that consider the relative risks 
and vulnerabilities of high-, medium-, and low-risk 
activities (De Koker 2009a). It is especially important 
to develop an informed view of the nature and 
the relative level of risk posed by financial services 
typically available to low-income clients. Information 
sources include government and development 
agencies and formal and informal financial service 
providers. Risks categorized by financial subsectors, 
institutions, transactions, client groups, and other 
relevant characteristics (e.g., geographic area) will 
help governments formulate proportional risk-control 
measures. Risk assessments should be done regularly 
and should be accompanied by an assessment of 
the likely impact of proposed AML/CFT controls on 
service providers and clients.
Understand the causes and impact  
of financial exclusion. 
To understand the potential impact of AML/CFT 
controls on financial inclusion, policy makers should 
understand the main causes of exclusion and the 
main groups affected. In many countries, a significant 
percentage of the population is unbanked. Often, a 
large percentage of the population comprises low-
income people, rural and periurban residents, and 
informal or undocumented migrants. 
Assess available resources to implement 
AML/CFT controls. 
To ensure effective implementation of AML/CFT 
controls and support for financial inclusion, policy 
makers should assess the capacity of financial service 
providers and financial sector regulators, as well 
as the coverage and integrity of the country’s ID 
system. 
Careful analysis can help a country design controls 
around the existing capacity of the relevant 
government agencies and service providers: 
Indonesia’s AML provisions regarding transaction •	
monitoring take into account the level of technical 
ability of financial services providers, requiring 
that they have an information management 
system (MIS) in place, but not prescribing any 
It is important to look at the size of the country’s 
informal sector and understand why clients are 
excluded: 
Clients•	  denied access. Lack of physical access 
to service points may prevent people from 
seeking formal financial services, especially 
in rural areas or locations with few branches, 
automatic teller machines, or other ways of 
accessing an account. Affordability is another 
barrier; it includes minimum balances for deposit 
accounts imposed by financial institutions, 
account fees, transaction fees, and other 
costs of using the product. Finally, regulatory 
barriers, such as ID requirements based on 
documents that are not freely available to low-
income people, may block access.
Clients•	  opting out. People may opt out of formal 
services if they see more benefits, in terms of 
cost, convenience, confidence, or cultural links, 
in going to informal financial service providers. 
Often, informal services are perceived as 
less costly, requiring less documentation, 
conveniently located and welcoming to this 
market segment. 
Market•	  inefficiency. Formal financial institutions 
may not yet see a market advantage to 
providing access, or they may be discouraged 
from expanding their clientele by regulatory 
burdens. At the same time, informal financial 
institutions (e.g., NGOs, associations, etc.) may 
not be allowed to receive licenses, or access 
other benefits of the formal financial sector if 
appropriate regulations are not available. 
Regulatory•	  costs. Providers may exit markets 
and potential providers may be barred from 
entering a market if the regulatory compliance 
costs are too high. If there are fewer providers, 
customers may find it more difficult to access 
appropriate products at an affordable price.
Box 3: Causes of exclusion
7particular type or level of technology. Where 
appropriate, even manual systems are allowed, 
which is particularly helpful for small institutions 
that lack technical MIS capacity but are able 
to monitor transactions effectively through a 
manual system.
South Africa’s AML/CFT system required financial •	
institutions to identify and verify all their existing 
clients in accordance with the new rules within 
12 months from the date the CDD obligations 
took effect. Long-standing clients who were not 
identified in accordance with the new rules risked 
having their accounts frozen. Clients and institutions 
struggled to comply, and banks found it very costly 
to meet such a tight deadline. The government 
therefore adjusted the timeline for identifying 
clients based on risk. Financial institutions were 
required to meet the CDD requirements for higher 
risk clients first, but were given two additional years 
to complete the procedures for lower risk clients.
Develop AML/CFT controls proportional 
to lower risk transactions and providers.
Where the risk of ML/FT is lower, countries can use 
the flexibility built into the FATF recommendations 
to design approaches that do not impede financial 
access. A proportional approach could include 
modifying client documentation and verification 
requirements, simplifying complex record keeping 
requirements, and launching new service channels.
Client documentation and verification. Low-income 
customers often maintain small account balances 
and conduct low-value domestic transactions that 
present lower risk for ML/FT. Several countries have 
adopted proportional controls for these accounts 
and transactions, where customers are exempted 
from some of the more onerous standard controls. If 
customers wish to conduct higher value transactions 
above a specific threshold, they are then required to 
comply with full standard verification requirements. 
Where risk is lower, reduced controls can facilitate 
financial inclusion. South Africa introduced a 
compliance exemption (Exemption 17) that relaxes 
its residential address verification requirement for 
those bank clients who hold low account balances 
(under US$ 3000), who conduct small transactions, and 
who do not conduct international transactions. These 
“mass banking clients” were considered relatively low 
risk even though it is typically difficult to verify their 
residential addresses. A recent study investigated 
the criminal abuse of these products. It found that 
while some abuse did occur, the level of abuse was 
substantially lower and the amounts involved were 
much less compared to the abuse of standard, non-
exempted products (de Koker 2008b). 
The following questions can be posed to help assess 
a country’s capacity to implement appropriate 
AML/CFT controls: 
Capacity of financial services providers
Are information and management systems •	
manual or electronic? Are they appropriate to 
the institutions’ operations? 
Can transaction limits, product restrictions, •	
and monitoring for suspicious transactions be 
supported by software?
What customer information is generally •	
available? 
What is the institutions’ current and feasible •	
reporting capacity?
What compliance requirements are already •	
being met? What is the capacity for increased 
compliance measures?
Capacity of financial sector regulators
Which agencies are mandated to regulate and •	
implement AML/CFT controls? What is—and 
should be—their reach?
Is coordination effective among agencies?•	
Do the agencies have adequate experienced •	
staff, training, systems, and budget?
Does an FIU exist? What is its capacity and •	
resources? 
Capacity of national ID system
Is there a national ID system or sources of ID •	
information?
What percentage of the population is covered •	
by the system? 
What factors limit people from obtaining an •	
official ID document?
What is the integrity of the system? How can •	
risks be mitigated?
Does the agency responsible for national •	
identification have adequate experienced 
staff, training, systems, and budget?
Box 4: How to assess capacity
8Record keeping for financial service providers. 
Requiring advanced MIS and paper copies of client 
verification and transaction records will increase 
costs of compliance and especially affect smaller 
institutions. Flexibility on MIS requirements could 
include allowing paper-based or simplified electronic 
MIS that meet AML/CFT reporting requirements, 
particularly for smaller institutions with limited 
numbers of clients and branches.
Branchless banking using new technologies and 
business models. Some new approaches, such 
as mobile phone banking,11 present specific risks, 
but they also allow advanced MIS to facilitate 
even more comprehensive client and transaction 
monitoring.12 Given the readily available information 
on transactions from mobile banking, flexibility on 
other controls may be reasonable. One option for 
domestic low-value transactions through mobile 
phone banking is to employ authorized agents who 
verify customer identity for new accounts. Another 
option is that taken by South Africa, which approved 
nonface-to-face client registration within the limits 
of Exemption 17. A bank offering the mobile phone 
product is required to obtain a name and a national 
ID number from the client and then cross-reference 
these against an acceptable third-party database 
and undertake additional electronic CDD measures. 
However, since the regulator feels this model 
introduces higher AML risk, clients who use the 
nonface-to-face registration process cannot transact 
against their accounts for more than R1,000 (US$120) 
a day. Given the unknown nature of the risk, the 
regulator therefore chose to limit the functionality 
of the account rather than to prohibit the business 
model. The control measures also allow for flexibility: 
clients who wish to transact for larger amounts can 
be released from the restrictions after submitting to 
regular face-to-face CDD procedures. (South African 
Reserve Bank 2008).13
Through ongoing consultation and monitoring, these 
proportional AML/CFT controls can be refined as risk 
and market conditions evolve.
Phase in AML/CFT implementation, 
where necessary. 
All countries should strive to meet FATF standards 
within a reasonable time and should ensure that 
primary processes are in place before secondary 
processes are imposed. If processes are not properly 
aligned, controls may be costly but have only limited 
effect.
Countries that do not have the resources to effectively 
regulate all areas of potential risk can use a risk-based 
and sequenced approach.14 Implementing AML/CFT 
Proportional controls, such as the following, might 
be considered for lower risk clients:
Allow verification from a range of documents •	
available to low-income people that matches 
the low risk of ML/FT abuse.
Simplify verification for low-value transactions •	
under a specified threshold. For example, 
clients may not be required to show proof of 
address or may be allowed to use alternate 
forms of identification to conduct a transaction 
below a specified limit.
Focus on client profiling, especially where •	
the national ID system is absent or weak. 
Where an institution collects additional client 
information, such as the person’s source of 
income, the intended use of the account, 
additional contact particulars, etc., it can draw 
a profile of that client and form an impression 
of the transactions that can be reasonably 
expected. That profile can be used to build the 
client relationship and monitor for suspicious 
transactions. Improved monitoring of the 
account on the strength of the client profile 
may offset risks introduced by simplified 
verification requirements.
Allow verification of information through •	
reliable third-party databases, such as credit 
information registries (credit bureaus) and 
government databases.
Box 5: Potential proportional controls for client identification
11 Mobile banking is a subset of branchless banking. This business model presents distinct AML/CFT issues because of the portability of the 
device, ability to track the movement of particular SIM cards, and increased information to monitor and link financial and telecommunications 
transactions.
12  See Chatain et al. (2008) for an in-depth discussion of mobile phone banking and AML/CFT issues.
13  Identification requirements for mobile phone users were introduced in mid-2009. These requirements (in terms of the Regulation of Interception 
of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002, as amended) are less flexible than the mobile banking 
measures and pose a challenge to transformational mobile banking in South Africa.
14  See FATF (2008a).
9controls based on risk, country context, and capacity 
of regulators and financial service providers is the 
most effective approach. AML/CFT controls can be 
phased in for nonregulated providers, building on 
these four increasing levels of responsibility and 
control measures:
Level 1: Require basic nonprudential registration 
of financial service providers. This is a first step for 
institutions that have not been publicly regulated or 
previously supervised. 
Level 2: Ensure traceability of clients and transactions. 
Requiring client identification and standardized client 
records will enable supervisors and investigators to 
trace transactions if needed. This is appropriate for 
community-based institutions and institutions with no 
previous experience with supervision.
Level 3: Increase requirements for client profiling, 
verification, and monitoring. As institutional capacity 
increases, requirements can be added commensurate 
with the institution’s product and client risk levels. 
This is typically appropriate for institutions that have 
a history of financial sector supervision.
Level 4: Enhance verification and interdiction. 
Where the national system allows a high level of client 
verification and transaction monitoring, suspicious 
transactions may be interdicted by law enforcement 
before they are finalized. This level of control is 
appropriate only where institutions and regulators 
have extensive capacity.
Promote market-based reforms to 
encourage people to seek formal 
financial services. 
Policy makers should promote measures that (i) allow 
informal financial service providers to formalize and 
(ii) encourage clients to migrate to formal providers. 
Clients who move to formal providers generally benefit 
from greater consumer protection, including certainty 
and proof of transactions. The financial sector benefits 
from a more stable system and formal intermediation 
of deposits and loans in the economy. Policy initiatives 
that promote financial inclusion and support AML/CFT 
controls include the following:
Create simplified nonprudential registration or •	
licensing procedures for informal financial service 
providers, especially those serving low-income 
clients.
Encourage codes of conduct for formal financial •	
service providers to increase their visibility and 
level of service to low-income clients.
Reduce the incentives to use informal channels, •	
for instance, exchange rate policies that may 
influence client behavior.
Facilitate the use of formal financial services •	
by undocumented migrants, especially for 
remittances and money transfers.
Encourage new market entrants that have cheaper •	
and more convenient business models, such as 
mobile banking and the use of nonbank agents.
Mobile phones hold great potential to increase 
financial access, but they are also potential channels 
of criminal activity. To balance perceptions against 
the fear of over-regulation, actual risks—rather than 
perceived risks—need to be identified using the 
following approaches:
Focus•	  on services, not providers. The lines 
differentiating financial providers in the banking, 
telecommunications, credit card, and mobile 
commerce sectors have become blurred. 
But the potential risks of mobile phone and 
payment systems operators more likely depend 
on the characteristics and complexity of services 
provided than on the service provider. A service-
based approach is also more conducive to 
creating a level playing field for providers of all 
types.
Differentiate•	  AML/CFT measures among four 
major types of mobile financial services. The 
four core mobile financial services are mobile 
financial information (m-fINFO), mobile bank 
and securities account (m-BSA), mobile payment 
(m-Payments), and mobile money (m-Money). 
These services are often provided jointly and, 
in some instances, one acts as a foundation for 
the others. The less the service models have 
in common with traditional financial service 
models, the more their associated risks and their 
potential to increase financial inclusion. M-fINFO 
has the most in common with traditional models 
while m-Money is the furthest removed.
Box 6: Mitigating ML/FT risks from mobile phone services
Source: Chatain et al. (2008)
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A government can encourage people to use formal 
financial services and create an environment that 
facilitates access to financial services. It is, however, 
difficult to change consumer behavior patterns. 
Examples of government efforts include formalizing 
remittances and tying inclusion to private sector 
incentives:
The Indonesian government tries to protect •	
migrant workers by encouraging them to use 
formal financial services. It requires migrant 
workers to open a formal bank account 
before working abroad. This approach has had 
some success; however, many workers still use 
informal services because they struggle to meet 
documentation requirements in the sending 
country and/or because they prefer to carry cash 
home with them.
Pakistan has a high inflow of remittances, and the •	
State Bank of Pakistan has done much to increase 
the flow of remittances through formal channels 
by reducing transfer costs and ensuring better 
official exchange rates. 
As one of the top three remittance-receiving •	
countries in the world, Mexico has been an 
active facilitator of remittance flows. The 
Mexican government has lobbied hard for U.S. 
institutions to accept the Matricula consular 
card as proof of identity for Mexican immigrants 
who lack formal U.S. residency documents. 
Because of these efforts, it is estimated that as 
much as 90 percent of the remittances between 
the United States and Mexico flow through 
formal channels.
The South African government, in conjunction •	
with the business community, labor, and 
community constituencies, created the conditions 
in which the South African financial services 
industry adopted the Financial Sector Charter 
in 2003. The Charter committed the banking 
industry to providing basic banking services to 
80 percent of lower income clients. The ability 
to secure government contracts is tied to these 
social targets, so institutions have an incentive 
to reach them. The Charter was a major policy 
intervention that spurred banks to cooperate in 
offering a highly successful basic bank account, 
the Mzansi account. More than 6 million of these 
accounts were opened to date.
Develop the national ID system. 
While a national ID document is not a precondition 
for an effective AML/CFT framework, the absence of 
reliable ID documentation or accessible verification 
sources complicates CDD processes, increases 
compliance costs, and undermines the effectiveness 
of AML/CFT controls. To address shortcomings in 
the national ID infrastructure that might pose barriers 
to financial access, there are several early examples 
of innovative AML/CFT controls that do not impose 
overly burdensome requirements:
Most Indonesian adults have a national ID card. •	
However, these cards are not issued centrally, 
and various institutions issue acceptable forms 
of identification. A person may have more than 
one ID document, and the information on them 
may differ. Concerns about corruption and ease 
of falsification further undermine the integrity 
of the documents. Nevertheless, the ID card is 
accepted for CDD purposes because it is the 
best available means of identification. Indonesia 
requires banks to use the information contained 
on the card and additional information requested 
from the client to develop a profile of the client 
and the client’s expected transactions. Typically 
clients are asked questions to ascertain their 
occupation, income, and expected transactional 
activity, although this information is not verified. 
Client profiles enable the bank to identify 
transactions that may be suspicious because they 
are inconsistent with the client’s profile. Profiling 
is a useful enhancement to the limitations of 
upfront identification using the card. Meanwhile, 
Indonesia is taking steps to improve the integrity 
of its national ID system.
South Africa has an extensive national ID •	
system, but its general AML/CFT requirement 
that a client’s residential address be verified 
was a potential problem for a significant 
number of low-income people who did not 
have proper documentation (e.g., utility bills, 
rental agreements). As a result, South Africa 
modified its AML/CFT regulations, allowing 
financial institutions to verify a person’s identity 
using the national ID document without having 
to verify the person’s residential address if 
the financial product meets a certain balance 
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limit (US$3000) and transaction restrictions 
(US$600 per day). This modest relaxation of 
the standard CDD requirements, which proved 
very helpful in increasing financial inclusion, was 
favorably considered by FATF in its 2009 mutual 
evaluation of South Africa’s compliance with 
FATF recommendations.
The United Kingdom is implementing a national •	
ID card system. Currently, a financial institution 
must obtain a client’s full name, residential 
address, and date of birth. This information is 
typically verified with a valid passport or photo 
drivers license and/or by accessing appropriate 
electronic databases. However, the system 
allows people who have difficulty meeting the 
standard requirements and who wish to open 
a basic banking account to present alternative 
documents. For example, individuals in assisted 
living accommodations may produce a letter from 
the facility manager and homeless individuals 
may produce a letter from an employer or the 
manager of a homeless shelter. 
If the existing ID system lacks adequate coverage or 
integrity or if it is not easily usable for CDD purposes, 
government agencies could adopt the following 
initiatives:
Define conditions, including reasonable fees, for •	
authorized financial institutions to access existing 
public databases.
Ensure that accurate data are collected and •	
stored safely.
Facilitate the establishment of new databases, •	
such as private credit information registries 
(credit bureaus), and allow the use of their 
records for CDD purposes. 
Evolve toward biometric means of ID •	
verification. 
Alongside national identification, countries should 
also ensure that their consumer data privacy rules 
meet international privacy standards. Unless personal 
data are protected, clients (and especially unbanked 
clients) may prefer informal (untraceable) financial 
services. The right of various government agencies 
to access the data, must also be considered. For 
example, potential clients may be reluctant to use 
formal financial services if their data are accessed by 
local or national tax authorities. 
Conclusion
The pursuit of financial inclusion and the combating 
of ML/FT can be—and should be—complementary 
national policy objectives. When low-income clients are 
excluded from formal financial services, the goals of the 
AML/CFT policy cannot be achieved. It is challenging 
to advance both objectives, but customizing AML/CFT 
policies to the local context, and implementing them 
sensitively, can deliver significant benefits to clients 
and financial services providers.
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